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Abstract
We review the derivation of quantum theory as an application of en-
tropic methods of inference. The new contribution in this paper is a
streamlined derivation of the Schro¨dinger equation based on a different
choice of microstates and constraints.
1 An overview
Quantum mechanics involves probabilities in a fundamental way and, therefore,
it is a theory of inference. But this has not always been clear. The controversy
revolves around the interpretation of the quantum state — the wave function.
Does it represent the actual real state of the system — its ontic state — or does
it represent a state of knowledge about the system — an epistemic state?
Examples of ontic interpretations include, to name a few, Bohm’s causal
interpretation, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, and Nelson’s stochastic
mechanics [1]. The epistemic interpretations have also had a number of ad-
vocates (for example, [2]-[5]) starting, most prominently, with Einstein. The
“orthodox” or Copenhagen interpretation lies somewhere in between. On one
hand, as described in standard textbooks such as the early classics by Dirac and
von Neumann, it regards the quantum state as a complete and objective specifi-
cation of the properties of the system — an ontic concept that is divorced from
the state of knowledge of any rational agent. On the other hand, the founders
of quantum theory — Bohr, Heisenberg, Born, etc. — were keenly aware of
the epistemological and pragmatic elements in quantum mechanics (see e.g.,
[6]) but, unfortunately, they wrote at a time when the language, the tools and
the rules of quantitative epistemology — the Bayesian and entropic methods of
inference — had not yet been sufficiently developed. As a result they did not
succeed in drawing a sharp line between the ontic and the epistemic and thereby
started a controversy that lingers to this day.
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But interpreting quantum theory is not merely a matter of postulating the
mathematical formalism and then appending an interpretation to it. For the
epistemic view of quantum states to be satisfactory it is not sufficient to state
that the probability |ψ|
2
represents a state of knowledge; we must also show that
changes or updates of the epistemic ψ — which include both the unitary time
evolution according to the Schro¨dinger equation and the projection postulate
during measurement — obey the rules of inference. In a truly epistemic interpre-
tation there is no logical room for “quantum” probabilities obeying alternative
rules of inference.
Our subject is Entropic Dynamics (ED), a framework in which quantum the-
ory is formulated as an example of entropic inference [8]. ED differs from other
approaches in several important respects. For example, in the standard view
quantum theory is considered as an extension of classical mechanics and there-
fore deviations from causality demand an explanation. In the entropic view,
on the other hand, quantum mechanics is an example of entropic inference, a
scheme designed to handle insufficient information [7]. From the entropic per-
spective indeterminism requires no explanation: uncertainty and probabilities
are the norm. It is certainty and determinism that demand explanations.
ED also differs from other approaches based on information theory. (See
e.g., [9]-[15].) In ED the laws of physics are rules for processing information.
The information in question possibly originates and might even find its ulti-
mate justification in some sub-quantum dynamics that remains to be discovered.
However, as we shall see, once the relevant information has been identified, the
remaining details of any such underlying dynamics turn out to be irrelevant for
behavior at the quantum level. In ED those irrelevant details are ignored from
the start — which is a significant simplification. The situation is somewhat
analogous to the laws of thermodynamics which also turns out to be largely
independent of microscopic details at the atomic level.
The analogy with thermodynamics has inspired several attempts to explain
the emergence of quantum behavior from specific proposals of a sub-quantum
dynamics with some additional stochastic element. (See e.g., [1][16]-[21].) In
contrast, ED does not assume any underlying mechanics whether classical, de-
terministic, or stochastic. Both quantum dynamics and its classical limit are
derived as examples of entropic inference.
Another difference is that ED naturally leads to an “entropic” notion of
time. Time is introduced as a convenient book-keeping device to keep track
of the accumulation of change. The task is to develop a model that includes
(a) something one might identify as an “instant”, (b) a sense in which these
instants can be “ordered”, (c) a convenient concept of “duration” measuring
the separation between instants. The welcome new feature is that entropic time
is intrinsically directional. Thus, an arrow of time is generated automatically.
ED offers a new perspective on the notorious problem of measurement (see
[3][22][23]). Questions such as “How can a measurement ever yield a definite
outcome?” or “Are the values of observables created during the act of measure-
ment?” led von Neumann to postulate a dual mode of wave function evolution,
either continuous and deterministic according to the Schro¨dinger equation, or
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discontinuous and stochastic during the measurement process. Once one ac-
cepts quantum theory as a theory of inference the dichotomy between the two
modes disappears. Unitary evolution and discontinuous collapse correspond to
two modes of updating probabilities which, as shown in [24], are not intrinsically
different; they are special cases within a broader scheme of entropic inference
[7].
Yet another distinguishing feature is that in ED the positions of particles
have definite values just as they would in classical physics. This implies that
the process of observation is essentially classical and measurements of position
automatically yield definite outcomes. This solves the problem of measurement
because position is the only observable. Indeed, in ED all other observables
such as momentum, energy, and so on, are statistical concepts — just like tem-
perature in statistical mechanics. They are not properties of the particles but
of their probability distributions. As shown in [25][26] their values are indeed
created by the act of measurement [27]. A more detailed treatment is given in
[28] and [7].
In order to formulate quantum theory as an entropic dynamics — just as
with any other inference problem — we must decide which microstates are
the subject of our inference, we must identify the prior probabilities, and we
must identify those constraints that represent the information that is relevant
to our problem. The new contribution in this paper is an entropic derivation of
the Schro¨dinger equation based on a choice of microstates and constraints that
differs and is in some respects more advantageous than the choice adopted in
[8].
2 Entropic Dynamics
In this model we consider particles living in flat three-dimensional space. The
particles have definite positions and it is their unknown values that we wish to
infer.1
The basic dynamical assumptions are that motion happens and that it is
continuous. Thus, short displacements happen and it is their accumulation
that leads to motion. We do not explain why motion happens but, given the
information that it does, our task is to venture a guess about what to expect.
For simplicity here we will focus on a single particle; the generalization to N
particles is straightforward. For a single particle the configuration space is R3
with metric δab. The particle moves from an initial x to an unknown x
′. The
goal is to to find the probability distribution P (x′|x). To find it maximize the
appropriate (relative) entropy,
S[P,Q] = −
∫
d3x′ P (x′|x) log
P (x′|x)
Q(x′|x)
. (1)
1In this work ED is developed as a model for the quantum mechanics of particles. The
same framework can be deployed to construct models for the quantum mechanics of fields, in
which case it is the fields that are objectively “real” and have well-defined albeit unknown
values.
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The relevant information is introduced through the prior probability Q(x′|x),
which reflects our knowledge about which x′ to expect before we have any in-
formation about the motion, and the constraints that specify the family of
acceptable posteriors P (x′|x).
The prior We adopt a prior that represents a state of extreme ignorance.
Knowledge of x tells us nothing about x′. Such ignorance is represented by a
uniform distribution: Q(x′|x)d3x′ is proportional to the volume element d3x′.
(The proportionality constant has no effect on the entropy maximization and
can be safely ignored.)
The constraints on the motion The information that motion is continuous
is imposed through a constraint. For a short step let ~x′ = ~x +∆~x. We require
that the expected squared displacement,
〈∆~x ·∆~x〉 = κ , (2)
be some small but for now unspecified value κ, which we take to be independent
of x in order to reflect the translational symmetry of the configuration space is
R
3.
If this were the only constraint the resulting motion would be a completely
isotropic diffusion. Clearly some information is still missing. The additional
piece of relevant information, that once particles are set in motion they tend to
persist in it, is expressed by assuming the existence of a “potential” φ(x) and
imposing that the expected displacement 〈∆xa〉 in the direction of the gradient
of φ is constrained to be
〈∆~x〉 · ~∇φ = κ′ (3)
where κ′ is another small but for now unspecified position-independent constant.
The seemingly ad hoc introduction of a potential φ will not be justified — at
least not here. The important point is that we have identified the information
needed for inference. Where this information originates and why it turns out to
be relevant are, of course, interesting questions but their answers lie elsewhere
— at some deeper level of physics. For the purpose of inference no further
hypotheses need be made.2
Having specified the prior and the constraints the ME method takes over.
Varying P (x′|x) to maximize S[P,Q] in (1) subject to the two constraints plus
normalization gives
P (x′|x) =
1
ζ
exp[−
1
2
α∆~x ·∆~x+ α′∆~x · ~∇φ] , (4)
2In our earlier development of ED [8] the set of microstates involved the positions x and
some additional mysterious variables that we called y. The present treatment is simpler in
that no y variables need be postulated. This simplification comes at a price. In the y-variable
model both the potential φ and the appearance of its gradient arise naturally without further
assumptions. Thus we have a trade-off. We can simplify the microstates at the expense of the
constraints. A deeper justification for φ, its geometric significance, and its natural relation
to gauge symmetries can be given and will be discussed elsewhere in the context of particles
with spin.
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where ζ is a normalization constant,
ζ(x, α, α′) =
∫
d3x′ e−
1
2
α∆~x·∆~x+α′∆~x·~∇φ . (5)
The Lagrange multipliers α and α′ are determined in the standard way,
∂ log ζ/∂α = −κ/2 and ∂ log ζ/∂α′ = −κ′ . (6)
Since both the function φ and the constant κ′ are so far unspecified, so is the
multiplier α′. Without loss of generality, we can absorb α′ into φ, α′φ → φ,
which amounts to setting α′ = 1.
Eq.(4) for P (x′|x) shows that short steps are obtained for large α and that
they happen in essentially random directions with a small anisotropic bias along
the gradient of φ. The distribution P (x′|x) is Gaussian and is conveniently
written as
P (x′|x) ∝ exp
[
−
α
2
(∆~x− 〈∆~x〉)
2
]
. (7)
The displacement ∆~x = ∆x¯ + ∆~w can be expressed as the expected drift plus
a fluctuation
〈∆~x〉 = ∆x¯ =
1
α
~∇φ , (8)
〈∆wa〉 = 0 and
〈
∆wa∆wb
〉
=
1
α
δab . (9)
As α→∞ the fluctuations become dominant: the drift ∆x¯ ∼ α−1 while ∆~w ∼
α−1/2. This implies that, as in Brownian motion, the trajectory is continuous
but not differentiable. Here we see the roots of the uncertainty principle: a
particle has a definite position but its velocity, the tangent to the trajectory, is
completely undefined.
3 Entropic time
The foundation of all notions of time is dynamics. In ED time is introduced as
a book-keeping device to keep track to the accumulation of small changes.
3.1 An ordered sequence of instants
In ED, at least for infinitesimally short steps, change is given by the tran-
sition probability P (x′|x) in eq.(7). The nth step takes us from x = xn−1
to x′ = xn. Using the product rule for the joint probability, P (xn, xn−1) =
P (xn|xn−1)P (xn−1), and integrating over xn−1, we get
P (xn) =
∫
d3xn−1 P (xn|xn−1)P (xn−1) . (10)
This equation is a direct consequence of the laws of probability. However, if
P (xn−1) happens to be the probability of different values of xn−1 at a given
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instant labelled t, then we will interpret P (xn) as the probability of values of
xn at the “later” instant t
′ = t+ ∆t. Accordingly, we write P (xn−1) = ρ(x, t)
and P (xn) = ρ(x
′, t′) so that
ρ(x′, t′) =
∫
d3xP (x′|x)ρ(x, t) (11)
Nothing in the laws of probability that led to eq.(10) forces this interpretation
on us — this is an independent assumption about what constitutes time in our
model. We use eq.(11) to define what we mean by an instant: if the distribution
ρ(x, t) refers to one instant t, then the distribution ρ(x′, t′) defines what we
mean by the “next” instant t′ = t + ∆t. Thus, eq.(11) allows entropic time to
be constructed one instant after another.
We can phrase this idea somewhat differently. Once we have decided on the
relevant information necessary for predicting future behavior we can imagine all
that information codified into an “instant”. Thus, we define instants so that
given the present the future is independent of the past.3
3.2 The arrow of entropic time
The notion of time as constructed according to eq.(11) is remarkable in that
it incorporates an intrinsic directionality: there is an absolute sense in which
ρ(x, t) is prior and ρ(x′, t′) is posterior.
Suppose we wanted to find a time-reversed evolution. We would write
ρ(x, t) =
∫
d3x′ P (x|x′)ρ(x′, t′) . (12)
This is perfectly legitimate but in order to be correct P (x|x′) cannot be obtained
from eq.(7) by merely exchanging x and x′. According to the rules of probability
theory P (x|x′) is related to eq.(7) by Bayes’ theorem,
P (x|x′) =
P (x)
P (x′)
P (x′|x) . (13)
In other words, one of the two transition probabilities, either P (x′|x) or P (x|x′),
but not both, can be given by the maximum entropy distribution eq.(7). The
other is related to it by Bayes’ theorem. There is no symmetry between the
inferential past and the inferential future because there is no symmetry between
priors and posteriors.
The puzzle of the arrow of time has a long history (see e.g. [29][30]). The
standard question has been how can an arrow of time be derived from underlying
laws of nature that are symmetric? ED offers a new perspective. The asymmetry
3An equation such as (11) is commonly employed to define Markovian behavior in which
case it is known as the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation. Markovian processes are such that
specifying the state of the system at time t is sufficient to fully determine its state after time t
— no additional information about the past is needed. We make no Markovian assumptions.
We are concerned with a different problem. We do not use (11) to define Markovian processes;
we use it to define time.
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is the inevitable consequence of entropic inference. From the point of view of
ED the challenge does not consist in explaining the arrow of time, but rather
in explaining how it comes about that despite the arrow of time some laws of
physics turn out to be reversible. Indeed, even when the derived laws of physics
– in our case, the Schro¨dinger equation – turns out to be fully time-reversible,
entropic time itself only flows forward.
3.3 Duration: a convenient time scale
Having introduced the notion of successive instants we now have to specify the
interval ∆t between them. This amounts to specifying the multiplier α(x, t) in
terms of ∆t.
Time is defined so that motion looks simple. For large α the dynamics is
dominated by the fluctuations ∆w. In order that the fluctuations
〈
∆wa∆wb
〉
reflect the symmetry of translations in space and time — a Newtonian time that
flows “equably” everywhere and everywhen — we choose α to be independent
of x and t, α(x, t) = C/∆t, where C is some constant.
The extension of ED to several non-identical particles is not our subject here
but a quick remark is useful. The extension is achieved by introducing separate
constraints, eq.(2), for each particle, each with its own κi, and each with its
own multiplier αi = Ci/∆t. It is convenient to write each of these multipliers
αi as αi = mi/~∆t in terms of a particle-specific constant mi and an overall
constant ~ which fixes the units of the mis relative to the units of time. Thus
α =
m
~∆t
. (14)
With this choice of the multiplier α the dynamics is indeed simple: P (x′|x) in
(7) becomes a standard Wiener process. The displacement is
∆~x = ~b∆t+∆~w , (15)
where ba(x) is the drift velocity,
〈∆~x〉 = ~b∆t with ~b =
~
m
~∇φ , (16)
and ∆wa is a fluctuation,
〈∆wa〉 = 0 and 〈∆wa∆wb〉 =
~
m
∆t δab . (17)
The formal similarity to Nelson’s stochastic mechanics [1] is evident but the
interpretations are completely different.
Two remarks are in order: one on the nature of clocks and another on the
nature of mass.
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On clocks: Time is defined so that motion looks simple. In Newtonian me-
chanics the prototype of a clock is the free particle. Time is defined so that the
free particle moves equal distances in equal times. In ED the prototype of a
clock is a free particle too. (For sufficiently short times all particles are free.)
And time is defined so that the particle undergoes equal fluctuations in equal
times.
On mass: The particle-specific constantm will, of course, be called ‘mass’ and
eq.(17) provides its interpretation: mass is an inverse measure of fluctuations.
4 Accumulating changes: the Fokker-Planck equa-
tion
Equation is an integral equation for the evolution of the distribution ρ(x, t). As
is well-known from diffusion theory [7] it can be written in differential form as
a Fokker-Planck equation (FP),
∂tρ = −~∇ · (ρ~b) +
~
2m
∇2ρ , (18)
which can itself be rewritten as a continuity equation,
∂tρ = −~∇ · (ρ~v) . (19)
The velocity ~v of the probability flow or current velocity is
~v = ~b + ~u where ~u = −
~
m
~∇ log ρ1/2 , (20)
the osmotic velocity, represents the tendency for probability to flow down the
density gradient.
Since both ~b and ~u are gradients, it follows that the current velocity is a
gradient too,
~v =
~
m
~∇Φ where Φ = φ− log ρ1/2 . (21)
With these results ED reaches a certain level of completion: We figured out
what small changes to expect — they are given by P (x′|x) — and time was
introduced to keep track of how these small changes accumulate; the net result
is diffusion according to the FP equation.
But quantum mechanics is not a standard diffusion. The discussion so far has
led us to the density ρ(x, t) as the important dynamical object but to construct
a wave function, Ψ = ρ1/2eiΦ, we need a second degree of freedom, the phase
Φ. The problem is that as long as the potential φ is externally prescribed the
function Φ in eq.(21) does not represent an independent degree of freedom. The
natural solution is to relax this constraint and allow φ (or equivalently Φ) to
participate in the dynamics. Thus the dynamics will consist of the coupled
evolution of ρ(x, t) and Φ(x, t).
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5 Non-dissipative diffusion
To specify the dynamics we follow [31] and impose that the dynamics be non-
dissipative, that is, we require the conservation of a certain functional E[ρ, φ]
which will be called “energy”.
At first sight it might appear that imposing that some energy E[ρ, φ] be
conserved is natural because it agrees with our classical preconceptions of what
physics ought to be like. But classical intuitions are not a good guide here.
In the more sophisticated approaches to physics energy is taken to be whatever
happens to be conserved as a result of invariance under translations in time. But
our dynamics has hardly been defined yet; what, then, is E and why should it be
conserved in the first place? Furthermore, if we go back to eq.(15) we see that
it is the kind of equation (a Langevin equation) that characterizes a Brownian
motion in the limit of infinite friction. Thus, the explanation of quantum theory
in terms of a sub-quantum classical mechanics would require that particles be
subjected to infinite friction while suffering zero dissipation at the same time.
Such a strange sub-quantum mechanics could hardly be called ‘classical’.
The energy functional E[ρ, φ] is chosen to be the expectation of a local “en-
ergy” function ε(x, t), that is,
E[ρ, φ] =
∫
d3x ρ(x, t) ε(x, t) , (22)
where ε(x, t) depends on ρ(x, t) and φ(x, t) and their derivatives.4 The local
energy appropriate to the non-relativistic regime is
ε(x, t) =
1
2
mv2 +
1
2
mu2 + V (x) , (23)
where the scalar function V (x) represents an additional “potential” energy. The
justification of ε is to be found in deeper-level physics but we can note that ε
is tightly constrained by requiring invariance under time reversal (~v → −~v and
~u→ ~u ) and the low velocity regime [32][8].
Using eqs.(20) and (21) the energy E is
E =
∫
d3x ρ
(
~
2
2m
(~∇Φ)2 +
~
2
2m
(~∇ log ρ1/2)2 + V
)
(24)
so that, after some algebra [8],
dE
dt
=
∫
d3x ρ˙
(
~Φ˙ +
~
2
2m
(~∇Φ)2 + V −
~
2
2m
∇2ρ1/2
ρ1/2
)
(25)
We impose that E˙ = 0 for spatially arbitrary choices of the initial conditions
ρ and Φ, that is, at the initial t0 we ought to be able to change ρ and Φ inde-
pendently at different locations and still get E˙ = 0. This implies the integrand
4In an energy eigenstate the local energy ε(x, t) is uniform in space and constant in time.
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should vanish at the initial t0. But any arbitrary time t can be taken as the
initial time for evolution into the future. Therefore for all t we require that
~Φ˙ +
~
2
2m
(~∇Φ)2 + V −
~
2
2m
∇2ρ1/2
ρ1/2
= 0 , (26)
which is the quantum version of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Equations (26)
and the FP equation,
ρ˙ = −~∇ · (ρ~v) = −
~
m
~∇ ·
(
ρ~∇Φ
)
(27)
are the coupled dynamical equations we seek.
These two real equations can be written as a single complex equation by
combining ρ and Φ into a complex function Ψ = ρ1/2 exp(iΦ). Computing the
time derivative Ψ˙ and using eqs.(26) and (27) leads to the Schro¨dinger equation,
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
= −
~
2
2m
∇2Ψ+ VΨ . (28)
Earlier we had introduced m as a particle-specific constant that measures fluc-
tuations, ~ as a constant that fixes units, and the entropic time t as a parameter
designed to keep track of the accumulation of changes. Their relation to familiar
physical quantities was a matter of conjecture. But now that we can see what
role they play in the Schro¨dinger equation we can identify m with the particle
mass, ~ with Planck’s constant, and the entropic time t with physical time.5
Other attempts to derive quantum theory start from an underlying, perhaps
stochastic, classical mechanics. The ED approach is different in that it does
not assume an underlying classical substrate; ED provides a derivation of both
Schro¨dinger’s equation and also Newton’s F = ma. Classical mechanics is
recovered in the usual limits of ~ → 0 or m → ∞. Indeed, writing S = ~Φ
in eq.(26) and letting m → ∞ with S/m fixed leads to the classical Hamilton-
Jacobi equation
S˙ +
1
2m
(~∇S)2 + V = 0 , (29)
while eqs.(17), (20), and (21) give m~v = ~∇S and ~u = 0 with vanishing fluctua-
tions
〈
∆wa∆wb
〉
= ~m∆t δ
ab → 0.
6 Measurement in ED
In practice the measurement of position can be technically challenging because it
requires the amplification of microscopic details to a macroscopically observable
scale. However, no intrinsically quantum effects are involved: the position of a
particle has a definite, albeit unknown, value x and its probability distribution
is, by construction, given by the Born rule, ρ(x) = |Ψ(x)|2. We can therefore
5Where by ‘physical’ we mean that it is the time t that appears in the laws of physics.
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assume that suitable position detectors are in principle available. First we con-
sider observables other than position: how they are defined and how they are
measured. Then we conclude with a few remarks on amplification and Bayes
theorem.
6.1 Observables other than position
The fact that the Schro¨dinger equation (28) is linear and unitary makes the
language of Hilbert spaces particularly convenient so from now we adopt Dirac’s
bra-ket notation and write Ψ(x) = 〈x|Ψ〉. For convenience we consider the case
of a particle that lives on a discrete lattice. The generalization to a continuous
space is straightforward. The probabilities of the previously continuous positions
ρ(x) d3x = |〈x|Ψ〉|2 d3x become pi = |〈xi|Ψ〉|
2 , (30)
and if the state is
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|xi〉 then pi = |〈xi|Ψ〉|
2 = |ci|
2 . (31)
Since position is the only objectively real quantity there is no reason to define
other observables except that they turn out to be convenient when considering
more complex experiments. Consider a setup in which right before reaching the
position detector the particle is subjected to additional interactions, say mag-
netic fields or diffraction gratings. Suppose the interactions in such a complex
setup A are described by the Schro¨dinger eq.(28), that is, by a particular uni-
tary evolution UˆA. The particle will be detected with certainty at position |xi〉
provided it was initially in a state |si〉 such that
UˆA|si〉 = |xi〉 . (32)
Since the set {|xi〉} is orthonormal and complete, the corresponding set {|si〉}
is also orthonormal and complete,
〈si|sj〉 = δij and
∑
i|si〉〈si| = Iˆ . (33)
Now consider the effect of this setup A on some generic initial state vector |Ψ〉
which can always be expanded as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
ici|si〉 , (34)
where ci = 〈si|Ψ〉 are complex coefficients. The state |Ψ〉 will evolve according
to UˆA so that as it approaches the position detectors the new state is
UˆA|Ψ〉 =
∑
iciUˆA|si〉 =
∑
ici|xi〉 . (35)
which, invoking the Born rule for position measurements, implies that the prob-
ability of finding the particle at the position xi is
pi = |ci|
2 = |〈si|Ψ〉|
2 . (36)
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Thus, the probability that the particle in the initial state |Ψ〉 after going through
the setup A is found at position xi is |ci|
2.
The same experiment can be described from a point of view in which the
setup A is a black box, a complex detector the inner workings of which are not
emphasized. The particle is detected at |xi〉 as if it had earlier been in the
state |si〉. We can adopt a new language and say, perhaps inappropriately, that
the particle has effectively been “detected” in the state |si〉, and therefore, the
probability that the particle in state |Ψ〉 is “detected” in state |si〉 is |〈si|Ψ〉|
2
— which reproduces Born’s rule for a generic measurement device. The shift in
language is not particularly fundamental — it is merely a matter of convenience
but we can pursue it further and assert that the setup A is a complex detector
that “measures” all operators of the form
Aˆ =
∑
iλi|si〉〈si| (37)
where the eigenvalues λi are arbitrary scalars.
Some remarks are in order. Note that when we say we have detected the
particle at xi as if it had earlier been in state |si〉 with eigenvalue λi we are not
implying that the particle was in the particular state |si〉 — this is just a figure
of speech. It is in this sense that the corresponding value λi of the observable
Aˆ has been “created by the act of measurement”. To be more explicit: if a
sentence such as “a particle has momentum ~p ” is used only as a linguistic
shortcut that conveys information about the wave function before the particle
enters the complex detector then, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as the
momentum of the particle. The momentum is not an attribute of the particle;
it is an attribute of the epistemic state Ψ(x).
Incidentally, note that it is not necessary that the eigenvalues of the operator
Aˆ be real — they could be complex numbers. What is necessary is that its
eigenvectors |si〉 be orthogonal. This means that Aˆ need not be Hermitian but its
Hermitian and anti-Hermitian parts of Aˆ must be simultaneously diagonalizable
— they must commute.
In the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics Born’s rule (36) is a
postulate; within ED it is the natural consequence of unitary time evolution
and the fact that all measurements are ultimately position measurements. This
raises the question of whether our scheme is sufficiently general to encompass all
measurements of interest. While there is no general answer that will address all
cases — who can, after all, even list all the measurements that future physicists
might perform? — we can, nevertheless, ask whether our scheme includes a
sufficiently large class of interesting measurements. How, for example, does one
measure an observable for which there is no unitary transformation mapping
its eigenstates to position eigenstates? Every case demands its own specific
analysis. For example, how does one measure the energy of a free particle? A
measurement device characterized by eigenvectors {|s〉} measures all operators
of the form Aˆ =
∫
ds λ(s)|s〉 〈s|. Therefore the same device that measures the
momentum pˆ of a particle (e.g., using a magnetic field or a diffraction grating
followed by a position detector such as a photographic plate or a photoelectric
cell) can also be used to infer the energy Hˆ = pˆ2/2m of a free particle.
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Here is another example: It is not so easy to place a probe inside the atom,
so how does one measure the energy of an electron that is bound to an atom?
In practice the energy of the bound particle is not measured directly; instead it
is inferred from the energy of photons emitted in transitions between the bound
states. Since photons are free particles measuring their energy is not in principle
problematic. This is a special case of the general scheme in which the system
of interest and the pointer variable of an apparatus become correlated in such a
way that observation of the pointer allows one to infer a quantity of the system.
The paradigmatic example is a Stern-Gerlach experiment in which the particle’s
position is the pointer variable that allows one to infer its spin.
The difficulty with the standard von Neumann interpretation is that it is
not clear at what stage the pointer variable “collapses” and attains a definite
value. This is precisely the difficulty of principle that is resolved in the entropic
approach: the pointer variable is a position variable too and therefore always
has a definite value.
7 Amplification
The technical problem of amplifying microscopic details so they can become
macroscopically observable is usually handled with a detection device set up in
an initial state of unstable equilibrium. The particle of interest activates the
amplifying system by inducing a cascade reaction that leaves the amplifier in a
definite macroscopic final state described by some pointer variable α.
An eigenstate |si〉 evolves to a position xi and the goal of the amplifica-
tion process is to infer the value xi from the observed value αr of the pointer
variable. The design of the device is deemed successful when xi and αr are suit-
ably correlated and this information is conveyed through a likelihood function
P (αr|xi) — an ideal amplification device would be described by P (αr|xi) = δri.
Inferences about xi follow from a standard application of Bayes’ rule,
P (xi|αr) = P (xi)
P (αr|xi)
P (αr)
. (38)
The point of these considerations is to emphasize that there is nothing in-
trinsically quantum mechanical about the amplification process. The issue is
one of appropriate selection of the information (in this case the data αr) that
happens to be relevant to a certain inference (in this case xi). This is, of course,
a matter of design: a skilled experimentalist will design the device so that no
spurious correlations—whether quantum or otherwise—nor any other kind of
interfering noise will stand in the way of inferring xi.
Acknowledgments I would like to thank D. Bartolomeo, C. Cafaro, N. Caticha,
S. DiFranzo, A. Giffin, P. Goyal, D. T. Johnson, K. Knuth, S. Nawaz, M. Regi-
natto, C. Rodr´ıguez, and J. Skilling for many discussions on entropy, inference
and quantum mechanics.
13
References
[1] E. Nelson, Quantum Fluctuations (Princeton UP, Princeton 1985).
[2] L. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970).
[3] L. Ballentine, Quantum Mechanics: A Modern Development (World Scien-
tific, Singapore 1998).
[4] C. Caves, C. Fuchs, and R. Schack, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics 38, 244 (2007).
[5] N. Harrigan and R. Spekkens, Found. Phys. 40,125 (2010).
[6] H. P. Stapp, Am. J. Phys. 40, 1098 (1972).
[7] A. Caticha, Entropic Inference and the Foundations of
Physics (USP Press, Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil 2012); online at
http://www.albany.edu/physics/ACaticha-EIFP-book.pdf.
[8] A. Caticha, J. Phys. A 44, 225303 (2011) (arXiv.org/abs/1005.2357).
[9] W. K. Wootters, Phys. Rev. D, 357 (1981).
[10] A. Caticha: Phys. Lett. A244, 13 (1998); Phys. Rev. A57, 1572 (1998);
Found. Phys. 30, 227 (2000).
[11] C. Brukner and A. Zeilinger, “Information and Fundamental Elements of
the Structure of Quantum Theory,” in Time, Quantum, Information, ed.
L. Castell and O. Ischebeck (Springer, 2003) (arXiv:quant-ph/0212084).
[12] R. Spekkens, Phys. Rev. A 75, 032110 (2007).
[13] P. Goyal, K. Knuth, J. Skilling, Phys. Rev. A 81, 022109 (2010).
[14] L. Hardy, “Reformulating and Reconstructing Quantum Theory”
(arXiv.org:1104.2066).
[15] M. Reginatto, “From information to quanta: a derivation of the ge-
ometric formulation of quantum theory from information geometry”
(arXiv:1312.0429).
[16] L. de la Pen˜a and A. M. Cetto, The Quantum Dice, an Introduction to
Stochastic Electrodynamics (Kluwer, Dordrecht, Holland 1996).
[17] M. J. W. Hall and M. Reginatto, J. Phys. A 35, 3289 (2002); Fortschr.
Phys. 50, 646 (2002).
[18] G. ’t Hooft, “Determinism beneath Quantum Mechanics”
(arxiv:quant-ph/0212095); “Emergent quantum mechanics and emer-
gent symmetries” (arxiv:hep-th/0707.4568).
14
[19] H. T. Elze and O. Schipper, Phys. Rev. D66, 044020 (2002) ; H. T. Elze,
Phys. Lett. A310, 110 (2003).
[20] S. Adler, Quantum Theory as an Emergent Phenomenon (Cambridge UP,
Cambridge 2004).
[21] G. Gro¨ssing, Phys. Lett. A 372, 4556 (2008) (arXiv:0711.4954); G.
Gro¨ssing et al, “The Quantum as an emergent System” J. Phys.: Conf.
Ser. 361 012008 (2012).
[22] M. Schlo¨sshauer, Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, 1267 (2004).
[23] G. Jaeger, Entanglement, Information, and the Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics (Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg 2009).
[24] A. Caticha and A. Giffin, “Updating Probabilities,” in Bayesian In-
ference and Maximum Entropy Methods in Science and Engineer-
ing, ed. by A. Mohammad-Djafari, AIP Conf. Proc. 872, 31 (2006)
(arXiv.org:physics/0608185).
[25] A. Caticha, Found. Phys. 30, 227 (2000).
[26] D. T. Johnson and A. Caticha, “Entropic dynamics and the quantum mea-
surement problem”, Bayesian Inference and Maximum Entropy Methods
in Science and Engineering, ed. by K. Knuth et al., AIP Conf. Proc. 1443,
104 (2012) (arXiv:1108.2550).
[27] S. Nawaz and A. Caticha, “Momentum and uncertainty relations in the
entropic approach to quantum theory”, Bayesian Inference and Maximum
Entropy Methods in Science and Engineering, ed. by K. Knuth et al., AIP
Conf. Proc. 1443, 112 (2012) (arXiv:1108.2629).
[28] D. T. Johnson, “Generalized Galilean Transformations and the Measure-
ment Problem in the Entropic Dynamics Approach to Quantum Theory”,
Ph.D. thesis, University at Albany (2011) (arXiv:1105.1384).
[29] H. Price, Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point (Oxford UP, New York
1996).
[30] H. D. Zeh, The Physical Basis of the Direction of Time (Springer, 2002).
[31] E. Nelson, “Connection between Brownian motion and quantum mechan-
ics,” in Einstein Symposium Berlin, Lect. Notes Phys. 100, p.168 (Springer-
Verlag, Berlin 1979).
[32] L. Smolin, “Could quantum mechanics be an approximation to another
theory?” (arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0609109).
15
